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I. Introduction 
In the fall of 2013, a group of students at the Bush School of Government and Public 
Service at Texas A&M University were approached to design and implement a survey to gauge 
the effectiveness of a youth employment program in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. At 
the fundamental level, it was necessary to know if the program was helping the children find 
employment and if that employment was increasing the incomes earned by participants. 
Vocational programs such as the one described in this paper, are not uncommon and have been 
shown to be quite effective in setting around the world.  For the first time though, an analysis of 
this type of program was implemented in the unique setting of Butembo, DR Congo.  Butembo, 
as will be described later, is a unique hub of peace within an area that has been ravaged by civil 
conflict in recent decades. 
In this particular context, the conflict affects youth in the area through displacement, loss 
of education, as well as through recruitment into the conflict or other activities that support rebel 
groups.  The research within this paper uses survey instruments in an effort to determine the 
level of effectiveness of the vocational program in the region that focuses on at risk and 
vulnerable youth. In this paper, our research team will describe the setting of both conflict in 
DRC and its effects on institutions and programs as well as the setting of this analysis.  In 
addition, information on the program, CEFADES, will be given along research design and the 
analysis of our findings. 
  
 
 
 
 II. CEFADES 
CEFADES stands for Le Centre d’Animation et de Formation pour un Développement 
Solidaire (The Center for the Animation and the Formation of Solitary Development).  The 
CEFADES program began at the Universite Catholique du Graben in Butembo, DR Congo in 
1999.  The program focuses on what the university calls ‘vulnerable’ youths in the area.  The 
primary goal of the program is to ensure the rights of vulnerable children, that these children are 
respected, and that their lives improve.  The secondary goal of the program is to reinsert children 
directly and indirectly affected by the armed conflict in the area back into their 
communities.  Since the beginning of the program, five hundred and ninety four children have 
gone through the program.  Although the program does not seek out former child combatants, 
reports from the organization indicate that one hundred and eighty eight participants during the 
program’s history have been former child combatants.  A large portion of the children in the 
program are what they refer to in the area as ‘street kids’ which captures any youth who may be 
orphaned, without financial support, without formal education, or without employment. 
Primary funding for the program comes from a Belgian NGO, Vlaams Internationaal 
Centrum or VIC.  Recruitment is among the local population by staff at the center and by word 
of mouth in the community.  The program targets the previously mentioned ‘street children’ and 
works to ensure that these children will no longer be forced to live on the streets by the end of 
the program.  The program not only focuses on employment but also reintegration of these 
children into their families if and when possible.  Oftentimes these children are not at home due 
to large family sizes or a lack of resources, ie food, for them within the home environment. The 
CEFADES program incorporates both literacy aspects as well as job training for 
participants.  Typically, classes of 50-60 children, both boys and girls, enter and receive daily 
lessons on reading and writing and simply mathematic skills in addition to their chosen area of 
vocational training.  The students follow a typical daily schedule with lessons provided 
throughout the day over a multi-month period. During a typical program, students can choose to 
specialize in areas such as carpentry, masonry, culinary skills, hair styling, dressmaking, auto 
mechanical repairs, and beekeeping.   
Another unique aspect to the CEFADES program is their ability to change these 
specialities as needed.  For example, if a specialized laborer within the community has need for 
trained worker, they can approach CEFADES and offer to train the students for their field of 
work.  For example: if a specialized mechanic such as foreign cars or motorcycles needs three 
workers to help his shop grow, he will work with CEFADES to train these students who will 
then go on to work for him in the future.  This has multiple benefits of allowing students to work 
directly with their employers in an apprenticeship that will transition into full time work in the 
future and also by responding to the needs of the local market so as not to flood the market with 
any one type of skilled labor.  If CEFADES created sixty dressmakers twice a year, the market 
would inevitably become unbalanced and the demand for labor in that one field would drastically 
decrease. 
 
III. Literature Review 
Amnesty International reported that educational and vocational training programs tailored 
to child soldiers have been slow to materialize.  However, some communities have reached a 
level of progress in this matter (Amnesty International 2008, pp. 14-15).  Aside from the lack of 
vocational training programs, the lack of research also poses a major challenge.  Sommers finds 
that a significant weakness in the literature regarding post-conflict vocational programs is the 
scarcity of program evaluations as well as the lack of presenting proven techniques that could 
positively impact the youth (Sommers 2006, pp. 24).  Juxtaposing current policy in Uganda 
where funding has been focused on broad-base reintegration programs, Blattman and Annan 
suggest that more targeted and specialized psychosocial services and educational programming 
are probably needed for those youth exposed to violence, whether abducted or not (Blattman and 
Annan 2010, pp. 895).  And although some rebel forces claim to educate children that join their 
ranks, we cannot safely determine the opportunity costs inflicted on children as actors in these 
groups and what alternative opportunities they may have pursued otherwise (Jo 2013, pp. 114).   
These costs are also inflicted on parents.  The cost of primary and secondary education presents a 
major challenge to families and minimizes opportunities of the poor youth.  Although primary 
education is free and mandatory in DRC, payment of school fees (teachers, buildings, insurance, 
etc.) heavily relies on parents (Weijs, Hilhorst and Ferf 2012, pp. 31).  In the case of non-
payment, students can be denied education.  Today, three out of four attend primary school in the 
DRC, while only 32 per cent attend secondary with near parity for boys and girls – though 
around only half the women aged 15 to 24 are literate (Institut National de la Statistique 2010).   
Some evidence suggests that the Butembo youth seek to modernize.  When interviewing 
displaced youngsters in Butembo, Raeymaekers noted a general trend in African countries 
emerging from conflict involving a steady urbanization and the youth’s refusal of “traditional” 
agricultural lifestyles and embrace more urban, modern ones (Raeymaekers 2011, pp. 26).  
Moreover, Richards and Chauveau suggested that in regions of West Africa ridden by armed 
groups, cutting off the supply of recruits by offering more suitable employment opportunities 
attractive to these youth would contribute to peace and stability in the region (Richards and 
Chauveau 2007, pp. 7).  Also they contested that an important element to conflict is “hyper-
mobility of the impoverished rural youth:” their inability to settle and forge professional and 
social attachments in rural and urban settings (Richards and Chauveau 2007, pp. 7). 
The World Bank also weighs in on the importance of employment and entrepreneurship as a 
result of education in DRC: 
 
“Post-conflict settings pose specific challenges for the youth (e.g., recently disarmed idle men and 
displaced young men) as these settings have prominently young populations, many of whom have been 
deprived of education, have grown up in violent societies, and often have been combatants themselves. 
Employment and the creation of jobs for young people should therefore form a key component of any 
peace building processes” (World Bank 2009).   
 
Child recruitment also presents a major problem to communities seeking development 
through the education of their youth.  More than a dozen of modern states have used child 
soldiers to fill the ranks of government and rebel forces, including in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo.  A closer look at these states show that among child soldiers, about 70 per cent of 
them are found in the ranks of non-state factions of whom 40 per cent are girls (Gazagne 2009, 
pp. 239). The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers estimated the number of child soldiers 
in Congo at 7,000 enlisted in government and armed groups including foreign forces operating in 
eastern Congo.  They were used as combatants, porters, guards, and sexual slaves (Coalition to 
Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 2008, 106-112).  Numbers of children recruited into either faction 
is determined by the intensity of the conflict.  Amnesty International reported that at the height 
of the conflict, around 30,000 children were estimated to be serving in either faction at any level.  
The majority of these children have been released to UNICEF or local NGOs (Amnesty 
International 2008, pp 14-15).  The report also mentioned that progress in releasing children have 
been seriously undermined in North Kivu.   
Given that many armed factions converge at the Kivus causing violent clashes that 
terrorize its local communities, schoolboys have begun to take up their communities’ defense by 
joining the ranks of local Mai Mai militias (Schulman 2013).  Nonetheless, the situation has not 
improved; many inhabitants complain that it has actually worsen due to recurring clashes 
between these factions.   
Blattman and Annan challenge the dominant view held by some media channels and 
international leaders that conflict youth are “traumatized, violent, social pariahs” (Blattman and 
Annan 2010, pp. 882).  They concluded that there is no clear evidence suggesting that youth 
engage in violence after conflict; the evidence points out instead to the negative economic impact 
inflicted on societies as a result of the time lost in conflict instead of time invested in education 
and/or training.  However, this economic cost is largely a function of the opportunity cost, 
especially in educational and economic opportunities for women (Annan, et al. 2011, pp. 25-26).  
This evidence also suggests that women are more resilient than men when dealing with post-
conflict trauma.  In Uganda, victims of violence show very small systematic difference in social 
participation and aggressive behavior compared to their peers; however, victims are more likely 
to vote and take on leadership roles (Blattman 2009, pp. 244) 
Despite their resiliency, psychological treatment to children exposed to violence may 
help them cope with the trauma and ease their return to a social lifestyle.  After interviewing 
local staff at a vocational training program in Eastern Congo, Johannessen and Holgersen 
derived that informants experienced that the former child soldiers required help transforming into 
normal civilians who participate proactively in their societies (Johannessen and Holgersen 2013, 
pp. 10).  Yet, evidence confirms that although exposure to violence leads to psychosocial 
problems and emotional distress, a serious expression of these symptoms persist only in a 
minority (Annan, et al. 2011, pp. 26). Support rather than rejection from families is the most 
common social norm.  
Conflict also has led to a major weakening of state institutions.  Milliken and Krause tell 
us that when the state becomes fragile, the government no longer is capable of providing social 
services and human suffering becomes widespread (Milliken and Krause 2002, pp. 764).  
However, particular to conflict zones, a hybrid political order emerged where education is being 
negotiated by state and non-state actors, namely religious networks and NGOs; ultimately, 
education’s economic survival is supported by parents as the state loses its regulatory power. In 
this decentralized model of education, DRC communities would benefit more from local-level 
arrangements between state and non-state actors (De Herdt, Titeca and Wagemakers 2010, pp. 
20).  The fact that the state has lost part of its regulatory power in education does not mean that 
the education sector is ungoverned; instead, the state’s administrative framework is being 
redefined as a result of this state and non-state negotiation (Titeca, Kristof and De Herdt 2011).  
As Hagmann and Peclard noted, the pseudo state that arises from the absence of the central 
government comes about through “negotiation, contestation, and bricolage” between state and 
non-state actors involved in service provision (Hagmann and Peclard 2010).  
The Catholic Church represents an important educational institution in DRC.  
Confessional schools represent a majority of almost 70 percent of which the catholic 
denomination educates approximately 50 percent of students (Weijs, Hilhorst and Ferf 2012, pp. 
38).  
Armed groups that occupy the region also take part of the institutional framework of 
Butembo.  On the one hand, rebels had to ally themselves to several commercial ventures to 
protect its base against other violent contenders (Raeymaekers 2007, pp. 112).  On the other hand, 
rebel leadership had to also build relationships with non-militant clandestine networks like 
Butembo trading network, the member of which some grew to become “village lords” 
(Raeymaekers 2007).  This interconnectedness can be seen beyond the relationship between 
rebels and economic elites.  Border towns like Butembo are renowned for the fluidity with which 
its inhabitants shift roles from government worker to smuggler to armed rebel (Raeymaekers 
2009, pp. 61).   
Interconnectedness is also described in the social networks and informal economies in 
Nigeria, where Meagher demonstrated how trade, manufacturing, and wars give rise to particular 
social dynamics embedded in community ethnic, class, or gender relations (Meagher 2010, pp. 
16).  She explains that “the key issue is not the boundaries between the official and the unofficial 
spheres, but the distinctive organizational dynamics and power relations that characterize non-
formal forms of order.”  In other words, informality is conceptualized not to be the opposite of 
formal, but an alternative terrain of regulation operating outside the framework of the State 
(Kabamba 2012, pp. 672).  Particularly to Butembo, Kabamba concludes that because the town 
was originally neglected by the colonial as well as the post-colonial state, the Nande, in a show 
of “strong embeddedness,” directed proceeds from gold-mining toward the town’s infrastructural 
development and elite foundation (Kabamba 2012, pp. 682).   
 
 
 
IV. Research Design 
 The research design of this evaluation is to determine the impact of the CEFADES 
training program on the economic livlihood of its participants.    A perfect impact evaluation 
would include randomized selection into the treatment, a pre-treatment survey of participants and 
of a control group made up of those who qualified for the treatment but were not admitted, and 
surveys conducted after the treatment of the same individuals over several years.  However, there 
were a number of reasons why such an approach could not be taken here.  Most notably, the 
program is an already existing program whose selection into treatment is not random, while there 
was only one opportunity to conduct the surveys and they had to be conducted post treatment.    
 To complete an accurate research evaluation, the research design had to mitigate the 
potential selection bias the selection process would have on the data.  A solid understanding of 
CEFADES’ recruitment methods would be required and additional information about the lives of 
the participants and non-participants would be needed to compare the two groups.  In addition, 
the limited time frame of a week to conduct as many surveys as possible required strong 
preparation and good survey design.  To ensure success, the evaluation included a team member 
already in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).  This team member’s responsibility 
included building relationships with local institutions, providing local feedback and perspective 
of the project, preparing and training the locations and enumerators for our evaluations, and 
conducting pre-surveys to better inform the phrasing and content of our survey questions.  The 
rest of the team members based in the US were tasked with designing and conducting the surveys 
during the one week journey to Butembo and analyzing the results. 
 The US team’s first task was to design the pre-surveys.  Common economic indicators 
were included, such as monthly income or working status, as well as background information of 
the respondent, such as where they were born, family information, gender, and other factors that 
could potentially affect their income, the selection into treatment, or both.  Once the pre-surveys 
were designed, they were sent to the DRC team member to translate and conduct. 
 Pre-Survey:   
 Once the US team received the information from the pre-survey, the questions and 
answers were redesigned to help respondents better understand.  For example, during the pre-
survey we discovered that many respondents were having trouble understanding how to respond 
to a Likert scale due to unfamiliarity with the format, forcing us to redesign many of our 
questions to gain the same information. 
 With the final surveys done, the US team traveled to Butembo to conduct the final 
surveys with local CEFADES staff and UCG student enumerators.  The treatment surveys were 
conducted in a building at the CEFADES facility.  As CEFADES has limited information on the 
current residences of former participants as well as a lack of time, the participants had to be 
invited to the CEFADES facility.  To ensure that the former participants would be willing to 
travel to the survey, we reimbursed their travel offered food as an incentive.  This action could, 
potentially, create a selection bias in our results because those former participants who were the 
most in need of food or money were the most likely to attend the surveys.  However, as this 
selection bias would underestimate our results (as the participants of the treatment survey would 
be those treated who were worse off), this was not considered a major issue. 
At these surveys, both participants who had not yet completed the training as well as 
participants who had completed the training were surveyed.  Current and former participants 
were led into the CEFADES building and then directed to a table with an enumerator.  Once 
survey was conducted, the participant was reimbursed for their travel costs and food was 
provided.  Through these surveys, we collected results for 49 current participants in the program 
and 330 former participants of the program for a total of 379 surveys. 
The control surveys were conducted in a very different manner.  Enumerators were sent 
out to different areas of Butembo under instruction to survey random youths they encountered.  
As the treatment group contains both men and women, the enumerators were instructed to speak 
to both genders.  In addition, as the treatment group’s age ranged from 10 to 25, they were also 
instructed to interview youths that appeared around that age.  After three days, the enumerators 
returned the completed surveys.  Respondents themselves did not receive any monetary 
incentives.  Through this method, results from 795 local youths for our control were received.  
V. Methodology of Analysis 
 As the surveys are post-treatment surveys with non-randomized selection into treatment, 
the main focus of the methodology was to minimize the effects of selection bias and to determine 
the impact of the project on the treated using these control and treatment groups.  The first step 
in the process was to analyze the selection and recruiting methods of the CEFADES program to 
determine what potential sources of selection bias occur and how they may affect our results. 
 CEFADES recruits participants in three ways: the psychologist on their staff actively 
looks around Butembo for youths who are worse off than others and offer recruitment into the 
program; youths are brought to the program by government workers and NGOs who believe the 
program would benefit the youth; and the project is advertised over the radio and in churches.   
 Most youths enter the program by being brought by an NGO or government.  As these 
groups would be most likely to send over a youth who they recognize as needing the program, it 
is likely that the selection bias from these sources is underestimating the impact of the program 
in the results.  This can also be said of the recruitment of youths by the psychologist, as he is 
specifically targeting youths in the neighborhood that are especially poor and vulnerable.   
 
   Figure 1: Average Monthly Income of Control and In Program Respondents 
 
 
 This downward selection bias from these sources is supported by the data.  Current 
participants in the program have been selected into treatment but have yet to feel the impact of 
the treatment.  As such, they provide a sampling of what the treatment group was like upon 
entering the program and can help us better understand what kind of selection bias CEFADES’ 
selection process provides.  Looking at figure 1, the control group’s income is substantially 
higher than the group currently in the program, showing that those who are entering the 
CEFADES program have less income than our control.  This selection bias is, therefore, 
underestimating the impact of the program in the results. 
 The other selection method used by CEFADES is advertising the program on the radio 
and through local churches.  While it has already been shown that participants entering the 
CEFADES program have a lower income as a whole, the fact that CEFADES is recruiting from 
churches has an additional effect on participants’ income which underestimates underestimating 
the impact of the program in the results. 
  Figure 2: Average Monthly Income of Church Goers and Non Church Goers among Control 
 
 
Figure 3: Church Attendance Rates Among Treated, Control, and Currently In Program Respondents 
 
 
 Figure 1 shows that, using data only from our control, that the income of respondents 
who attends church is less than those who do not attend church.  Figure 2 demonstrates that the 
percentage of the treatment group and those currently in the program are higher than the 
percentage in the control.  As such, CEFADES recruits many participants from churches and 
people in Butembo who attend church tend to be poorer, which means that CEFADES 
participants are poorer than the average person in Butembo and, therefore, means the results are 
underestimating the impact of the program. 
 Overall, the impact of CEFADES’ selection process is causing our results to 
underestimate the impact of the program.  In order to account for other factors that can affect 
income, OLS regressions are used with monthly income as the dependent variable.  To determine 
the impact of the program on working status, a probit regression was also used with whether or 
not they are working as the dependent variable.  
 As Butembo is in a high conflict area with a large child soldier population, much interest 
has been shown about how this program affects the livelihoods of former child soldiers in 
particular.  As the program targets at-risk youths, and much of the at-risk youth population in 
Butembo are former child soldiers, this question is particularly relevant in determining the 
impact of the CEFADES program.  In order to determine this separate impact, child soldier 
status was also collected from the respondents in the control and treatment groups.  Using this 
information, a Difference-in-Difference regression using an interaction variable for treatment 
status and child soldier status was also run to see if the program has any additional impact on the 
child soldier population in particular. 
 
VII. Results 
 There are two main outcome variables that are being used to determine the impact of the 
program on the economic well-being of the participants.  The first is a dummy variable for the 
current working status of the respondent.  The second is that income that respondent has earned 
in the last 30 days. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
   Figure 4: Working Status of Treatment and Control Groups 
 
 
Figure 5: Average Income of the Treatment and Control Groups 
 
 
 Figure 4 shows the percent of the treatment population who are currently working and not 
working and the percent of the control population who are currently working and not working.  
The difference in the treatment population between the percent who are working and the percent 
who are not working is much greater than the same difference in the control population.  In other 
words, there is a greater percentage of the treatment group who are working than the control 
group. 
 Figure 5 shows the average income in US dollars for the treatment and control groups.  
The treatment group is earning over $30 a month (a little more than $1 a day) while the control 
group is earning much closer to $15 a month (or 50 cents a day).  This graph not only 
demonstrates the absolute poverty of the region, but it also shows that the treatment group is 
earning twice the money of the control group.        
 
     Table 1: Probit Regressions Demonstrating Treatment’s Impact on Working Status 
    Dependent Variable: Working Status 
 I II III 
    
Treated 0.477*** 0.389*** 0.417*** 
 (0.093) (0.103) (0.106) 
Age  0.050*** 0.050*** 
  (0.019) (0.019) 
Male  0.297*** 0.274*** 
  (0.094) (0.096) 
Child Soldier  -0.087 -0.089 
  (0.143) (0.143) 
Orphan  0.065 0.074 
  (0.098) (0.099) 
Years of 
Education 
 -0.001 0.001 
  (0.014) (0.014) 
Have Children  0.400*** 0.387*** 
  (0.135) (0.136) 
Attend Church   -0.116 
   (0.092) 
Constant 0.083 -1.079*** -1.022*** 
 (0.050) (0.322) (0.326) 
    
N 913 871 860 
Pseudo R² 0.0219 0.0513 0.0527 
    
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 There are several other variables that can affect the working status and income of an 
individual.   Several regressions were run to account for these other factors.  Probit regressions 
were run with a dummy variable for working status was used as the dependent variable and 
treatment was used as the main independent variable.  Control variables were added for the 
respondents’ age, gender, and years of education as research has shown that these play a direct 
role in income and working status.  Additional control variables were added for whether or not 
the respondent was a former child soldier, has any children, or was an orphan in an attempt to 
account for the family support structure of the child soldier.  As it was demonstrated that 
           Table 2: OLS Regressions Demonstrating Treatment’s Impact on Income 
    Dependent Variable: Log of Monthly Income 
 I  II III 
    
Treated 1.164*** 0.897*** 1.109*** 
 (0.298) (0.327) (0.339) 
Age  0.248*** 0.247*** 
  (0.054) (0.055) 
Male  1.118*** 0.919*** 
  (0.314) (0.317) 
Child Soldier  -0.160 -0.132 
  (0.451) (0.448) 
Orphan  -0.081 -0.045 
  (0.306) (0.308) 
Years of 
Education 
 0.025 0.031 
  (0.045) (0.046) 
Have Children  0.818* 0.770* 
  (0.421) (0.426) 
Attend Church   -0.865*** 
   (0.295) 
Constant 6.090*** 0.716 1.247 
 (0.174) (0.944) (0.948) 
    
N 922 878 866 
R-squared 0.016 0.070 0.078 
    
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
attending church both impacts the selection into treatment as well as the respondent’s income, it 
too was included as a control variable.   
 The results of the probit regressions are shown on Table 1.  Here the treatment is shown 
to have both a positive and statistically significant impact on the working status of the individual.  
The coefficient of this regression suggests that the treatment increases the likelihood of working 
by roughly 40%. 
 To determine how the treatment affects income, OLS regressions were ran where the 
natural log of monthly income was used as the dependent variable to ease interpretation of the 
 
 Table 3: OLS Regressions Demonstrating Treatment’s Impact on Working Status with Child Soldier Interaction Term 
    Dependent Variable: Working Status 
 I II III 
    
Treated 0.541*** 0.466*** 0.488*** 
 (0.102) (0.114) (0.116) 
Child Soldier 0.349** 0.125 0.114 
 (0.174) (0.182) (0.182) 
Interaction -0.545** -0.469* -0.446 
 (0.261) (0.278) (0.278) 
Age  0.051*** 0.051*** 
  (0.019) (0.019) 
Male  0.284*** 0.264*** 
  (0.095) (0.097) 
Orphan  0.064 0.071 
  (0.098) (0.099) 
Years of 
Education 
 0.002 0.003 
  (0.014) (0.014) 
Have Children  0.388*** 0.377*** 
  (0.135) (0.136) 
Attend Church   -0.103 
   (0.092) 
Constant 0.052 -1.117*** -1.062*** 
 (0.053) (0.321) (0.326) 
    
N 910 871 860 
Pseudo R² 0.0253 0.0538 0.0550 
    
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
results.  The main independent variable was again treatment, and the same controls were used.   
 Looking at Table 2, once again we can see that the coefficient for treatment is both 
positive and statistically significant.  As the dependent variable was the log of monthly income, 
we can interpret the coefficient for the treatment variable as a percent change in income.  
Attending the program, therefore, increases the income of the participant by 90-100%.    
 To determine the project’s impact on child soldiers, another probit regression was run 
where working status is the dependent variable and another OLS regression where the log of 
 
         Table 4: OLS Regressions Demonstrating Treatment’s Impact on Income with Child Soldier Interaction Term 
   Dependent Variable: Log of Monthly Income 
 I II III 
    
Treated 1.025*** 0.756** 0.919** 
 (0.327) (0.356) (0.366) 
Child Soldier 0.281 -0.560 -0.689 
 (0.658) (0.653) (0.649) 
Interaction 0.631 0.870 1.217 
 (0.875) (0.874) (0.867) 
Age  0.248*** 0.246*** 
  (0.055) (0.055) 
Male  1.146*** 0.949*** 
  (0.314) (0.316) 
Orphan  -0.078 -0.037 
  (0.306) (0.308) 
Years of 
Education 
 0.020 0.024 
  (0.046) (0.046) 
Have Children  0.835** 0.792* 
  (0.422) (0.426) 
Attend Church   -0.899*** 
   (0.294) 
Constant 6.082*** 0.780 1.354 
 (0.180) (0.947) (0.950) 
    
Observations 918 878 866 
R-squared 0.019 0.071 0.080 
    
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
monthly income is the dependent variable.  An interaction term was added between treatment 
and child soldier to represent any additional impact the treatment has on child soldiers.   
 Table 3 shows the probit regressions demonstrating the treatment’s impact on child 
soldiers working status.  The interaction term is statistically significant when we include all the 
controls except attending church, and even then, the coefficient for our interaction term changes 
by only a small amount.  Overall, the regressions suggest that the program does have an impact 
on child soldiers’ working status in addition to the impact it has on the treatment group in 
 
          Table 5: Quartile Regressions Demonstrating the Impact of the Treatment on Child Soldiers’ Income by Quartile 
    Dependent Variable: Log of Monthly Income 
 (25%) (50%) (75%) (25%) (50%) (75%) 
 I II III IV V VI 
       
Treated 4.615*** 1.120*** 0.357*** 1.677*** 0.663*** 0.460*** 
 (0.348) (0.332) (0.127) (0.570) (0.210) (0.156) 
Child Soldier 0.000 1.204** 1.050*** -1.759** 0.441 0.292 
 (0.322) (0.569) (0.225) (0.864) (0.347) (0.263) 
Interaction 2.986*** -1.182 -0.490 4.224*** -0.658 -0.113 
 (0.780) (0.857) (0.330) (1.298) (0.506) (0.383) 
Age    0.485*** 0.162*** 0.065** 
    (0.082) (0.034) (0.027) 
Male    1.113** 0.851*** 0.449*** 
    (0.487) (0.185) (0.142) 
Orphan    -0.215 0.015 0.104 
    (0.474) (0.184) (0.139) 
Years of 
Education 
   -0.054 0.049* 0.036* 
    (0.073) (0.026) (0.019) 
Have Children    0.215 1.088*** 0.774*** 
    (0.640) (0.239) (0.190) 
Attend Church    -1.167** -0.553*** -0.421*** 
    (0.454) (0.174) (0.132) 
Constant -0.000 8.007*** 9.547*** -6.571*** 4.381*** 7.949*** 
 (0.105) (0.182) (0.071) (1.403) (0.598) (0.464) 
       
N 918 918 918 866 866 866 
Pseudo R² 0.029 0.008 0.009 0.056 0.052 0.041 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
general. 
 Table 4 shows the OLS regressions demonstrating the treatment’s impact on child 
soldiers’ income.  In all three regressions, the coefficient for the interaction term is statistically 
insignificant.  In other words, we cannot say that the program has any additional benefit to child 
soldiers’ income beyond that received by the treatment group in general.  However, when a 
quartile regression is run with the same variables, as in Table 5, we do get a statistically 
significant result.  This statistically significant result occurs in the lowest 25% quartile, is very 
statistically significant, and suggests that child soldiers’ income in this lower quartile increases 
by over 400%.  As we know from the regressions in Table 3 that the treatment is increasing the 
likelihood of child soldiers to be working, then the quartile regression result should be easier to 
interpret.  Child soldiers who are in the bottom 25% quartile likely represent those child soldiers 
who have had the greatest difficulty readjusting to society and have missed more years of 
schooling.  As such, the increased likelihood of finding a job benefits the child soldiers in the 
bottom quartile more as they have a bigger boost in human capital having started off at a lower 
point.   
 These results demonstrate that the CEFADES program has a significant and strong 
impact on the economic lives of its participants.  Respondents who completed CEFADES had a 
greater likelihood of working and a greatly improved income.  Child soldiers, a subset of the 
CEFADES program of great interest to many researches, receive additional benefit from this 
program, especially those who are the worst off, through increased likelihood of finding 
employment.   
VII. Conclusion 
The results of this study have demonstrated that the CEFADES program is increasing the 
employment and the income of its participants through the collection of surveys and the use of 
regression analysis.  There are a great many implications of this project on current literature and 
for the participating partners. 
Literature on the effects of educational attainment in conflict zones is at most lacking.  As 
Blattman and others have suggested, more data is required to understand the relationship 
between education and conflict.  Our study has added further to the academic consensus that 
educational attainment and vocational training may offer better alternatives to families living in 
conflict zones as well as improve the economic standing of these communities.  As evidenced by 
some of the literature, some of the Butembo youth join the ranks of the Mai Mai rebels because 
they perceive them as a better economic alternative to what is offered elsewhere, or because 
simply there were not any other options available.  What programs like CEFADES might offer is 
an alternative to this choice making, particularly among the poor and disenfranchised children.  
Further study is needed to sum to this upcoming body of evidence.    
Evaluations of programs such as the CEFADES are an effective way to ensure that the 
programs are reaching their intended goal.  This analysis shows that the program is in fact 
working.  The implications from these findings are diverse for the several stakeholders 
involved.  The literature on the effects of educational attainment in conflict zones is at most 
lacking.  As Blattman and others have suggested, more data is required to understand the 
relationship between education and conflict.  This study has added further to the academic 
consensus that educational attainment and vocational training may offer better alternatives to 
families living in conflict zones as well as improve the economic standing of these 
communities.  As evidenced by some of the literature, some of the Butembo youth joined the 
ranks of the Mai Mai rebels because they perceive them as a better economic alternative to what 
is offered elsewhere, or because simply there were not any other options available.  What 
programs like CEFADES might offer is an alternative to this choice making, particularly among 
the poor and disenfranchised children.  Further study is needed to sum to this upcoming body of 
evidence. 
This evaluation can and should be used by the Universite Catholique du Graben to ensure 
the continuation of the program in the future.  In addition to this, the Conflict and Development 
Lab at Texas A&M along with partners such as USAID can utilize this information to create 
similar programs in contexts close to Butembo that will maximize success in other countries. 
Other communities in the region and NGOs operating in areas exposed to conflict may adopt the 
CEFADES model as they perceive its success and the international attention brought on to these 
kind of programs.  As with any project in a fragile context, the implementation of CEFADES in 
another country, region, or community will not be an automatic success.  The established peace 
within the area, the strength of the local institutions, as well as the positive reception by the 
community have all be contributing factors to the success of CEFADES within the Butembo 
context. Ultimately, in fragile and conflict-affected countries, unemployed youth must be 
addressed in order to help create security in both the social and the economic realms. The 
involvement of all parties – including warring factions – in the educational progress of Butembo 
may be key to the consistency and future sustainability of CEFADES.  Programs such as 
CEFADES can be used to help in the creation and the maintenance of this security by giving 
youth the skills necessary to find employment as well as allow them to earn incomes at greater 
levels than those without training. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Appendix:  Propensity Score Matching 
 In addition to the main regressions results section of the paper, additional regressions 
were run using Propensity Score Matching (PSM).  PSM was done by running a probit 
regression with treatment as the dependent variable and numerous control variables to determine 
which had an impact on selection.  From this, age, whether or not the participant was an orphan, 
whether or not they had children, whether or not they were a child soldier, years of education, 
and whether or not they attended church all had an impact on their selection.  The OLS 
regressions were rerun weighted by the propensity score determined in Stata.  As the results of 
our PSM regressions did not substantially differ from our main regressions, they were not 
included in our main results.  However they are added here for additional robustness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           Table A1: OLS Regressions Demonstrating Treatment’s Impact on Income with PSM 
    Dependent Variable: Log of Monthly Income 
 I II III 
    
Treated 1.545*** 1.291*** 1.483*** 
 (0.334) (0.353) (0.361) 
Age  0.267*** 0.272*** 
  (0.061) (0.061) 
Male  1.054*** 0.930*** 
  (0.353) (0.353) 
Child Soldier  -0.122 -0.225 
  (0.466) (0.462) 
Orphan  0.057 0.033 
  (0.324) (0.323) 
Years of 
Education 
 0.082 0.100* 
  (0.051) (0.051) 
Have Children  0.664 0.586 
  (0.485) (0.485) 
Attend Church   -0.925*** 
   (0.323) 
Constant 6.002*** -0.191 0.321 
 (0.206) (1.025) (1.032) 
    
N 866 866 866 
R-squared 0.031 0.100 0.109 
    
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table A2: OLS Regressions Demonstrating Treatment’s Impact on Income with Child Soldier Interaction Term and PSM 
    Dependent Variable: Log of Monthly Income 
 I II III 
    
Treated 1.423*** 1.240*** 1.387*** 
 (0.361) (0.383) (0.388) 
Child Soldier 0.335 -0.248 -0.478 
 (0.696) (0.674) (0.671) 
Interaction 0.354 0.243 0.482 
 (0.955) (0.919) (0.918) 
Age  0.267*** 0.271*** 
  (0.061) (0.061) 
Male  1.064*** 0.946*** 
  (0.355) (0.354) 
Orphan  0.060 0.039 
  (0.324) (0.323) 
Years of 
Education 
 0.080 0.097* 
  (0.052) (0.052) 
Have children  0.667 0.591 
  (0.485) (0.485) 
Attend Church   -0.948*** 
   (0.321) 
Constant 5.951*** -0.161 0.394 
 (0.212) (1.018) (1.025) 
    
Observations 866 866 866 
R-squared 0.034 0.101 0.110 
    
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table A3: Quartile Regressions Demonstrating the Impact of the Treatment on Child Soldiers’ Income by Quartile with PSM 
    Dependent Variable: Log of Monthly Income 
 (25%) (50%) (75%) (25%) (50%) (75%) 
 I II III IV V VI 
       
Treated 6.909*** 1.184*** 0.511*** 3.554*** 0.802*** 0.666*** 
 (0.000) (0.270) (0.185) (0.667) (0.281) (0.160) 
Child Soldier 0.000 1.204*** 1.099*** -1.449 0.568 0.399 
 (0.000) (0.422) (0.292) (1.012) (0.452) (0.252) 
Interaction 0.693*** -1.184* -0.511 2.631* -0.812 -0.539 
 (0.000) (0.644) (0.451) (1.476) (0.654) (0.363) 
Age    0.408*** 0.161*** 0.074*** 
    (0.111) (0.048) (0.026) 
Male    1.433** 0.932*** 0.398*** 
    (0.592) (0.258) (0.152) 
Orphan    0.097 0.098 0.162 
    (0.545) (0.242) (0.141) 
Years of 
Education 
   0.113 0.072* 0.054*** 
    (0.090) (0.037) (0.020) 
Have Children    0.004 1.012*** 0.711*** 
    (0.806) (0.343) (0.199) 
Attend Church    -1.277** -0.692*** -0.462*** 
    (0.544) (0.242) (0.138) 
Constant -0.000 8.007*** 9.393*** -6.316*** 4.281*** 7.658*** 
 (0.000) (0.149) (0.101) (1.824) (0.842) (0.480) 
       
N 866 866 866 866 866 866 
Pseudo R² 0.077 0.012 0.004 0.104 0.059 0.044 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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